#ai-security-research

[...] Put these pieces together and you have the two halves of a worm: a payload that hijacks the agent, and an agent that will carry the payload to the next agent. Agents in separately-isolated sandboxes discovered that they could leave instructions for each other in a shared package cache, and those instructions changed what the recipients did. Replace the package cache with email, Slack and shared documents or WhatsApp, and replace independently-sandboxed training runs with independently-deployed personal agents like Muse, and you have exactly the ingredients that a worm needs. — Matthew Green , Is sandboxing sufficient to contain rogue agents? Tags: accidental-cyberattacks , ai-misuse , generative-ai , ai-security-research , sandboxing , ai , llms

We evaluate several models on 100 tasks from the [internal Binary Exploitation benchmark] (selected at random), and find that GLM-5.3 develops full control flow hijacks in 4% of the trials; Claude Mythos Preview did so in 6%. Although GLM-5.3 performs below Claude Mythos Preview here, a meaningful threshold has clearly been crossed: earlier models, like Claude Opus 4.6 and GLM-5.2, do not succeed in any of them. — Anthropic Frontier Red Team , GLM-5.3 and the spread of advanced cyber capabilities Tags: anthropic , generative-ai , ai-security-research , glm , ai , ai-in-china , llms

To say that we were surprised at the jump and suddenness of the capabilities of our models when it came to “cyber” or “swarming” or “message boards” or anything else related to the incidents is an understatement. Security posture takes time to develop. It’s not just about hardening the systems at play; you have to ingrain it in the culture of the company. The literal people themselves in your organization have to change and evolve with it. These jumps in capabilities were so fast and so sudden that they created an extremely difficult problem. [...] So today my hope is that everyone around the world can look at their own organization and say: how can I deal with a surprise or a sudden jump in AI capability? Are my people, my systems, or my processes resilient to surprises? Do my teams know what to do when something goes wrong? Do I have the right incident response? The right comms and messaging? Do I have the right people ready to go when capabilities jump? — @joedaroo , Agent Security at OpenAI, identity confirmed by The Information's Rocket Drew Tags: generative-ai , ai-security-research , openai , ai , llms

On Friday I gave the closing keynote at the WeAreDevelopers World Congress North America in San Jose. I tied together the key trends from the past year into a chronological exploration of everything that happened in 2026. The video is on YouTube ; here are my annotated slides and notes to accompany the talk. And as an annotated presentation : # I'm going to give a lightning tour of everything that has happened so far in 2026. The year isn't over yet! # For me, 2026 started a couple of months earlier in November 2025. # November saw the release of two important models: Claude Opus 4.5 and GPT-5.1. As is usually the case with new models, these were incremental improvements on the models that came before them. But every now and then when a model improves, it crosses an invisible line where something that didn't really work starts working. In this case, the thing that started working was their coding agents. Claude Code had been around since February 2025; Codex was a little younger. These two new models, when paired with their respective coding agent harnesses, improved from "often make mistakes" to "reliable enough to use on a day-to-day basis". # For a couple of years now I've been